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The first remarkable aspect of this passage is Adorno's claim that the moment of the realisation of philosophy was missed. 8 This suggests that Adorno thought there was a window of opportunity for a revolution -presumably, he is thinking here of the period from the Russian Revolution and the later stages of the First World War to fascism taking power in Italy, Germany, and Spain and the show trials in Moscow. During this period, class conflict was often openly fought, with a number of failed revolutionary attempts in Germany and elsewhere, while the Soviet Union was struggling to survive and establish a socialist society.
The factors which explain the failure of the revolution in Germany and elsewhere are manifold -ranging from open repression to more subtle hindrances -and I cannot do justice to them here. The crucial point is that the missed opportunity had world-historical significance for Adorno. Indeed, it presents the foundational problem for (what was later known as) the Frankfurt School. Its members asked: Why and how was this opportunity missed? How could it happen that the proletariat -and humanity as a whole -remained in servitude? In particular, how could this be, despite the fact that, at least in the industrial West, the objective conditions for a social world without hunger and the need for domination had been in place?
One of the most damaging disappointments of these tragic times was the tyrannical nature of the Soviet Union. The Moscow show trials of 1936 are a turning point for Adorno
and Horkheimer, and after these trials, they refused to support the regime or, even, place any hope in its future. These trials brought down the final curtain on freedom of expression and the possibility of critique, and revealed this supposedly socialist society as the bureaucratic dictatorship that it had become. Turning Marxist theory into dogma and suppressing (critical) thinking were -at least in Adorno's view -important factors for why the transformation of 5 the world failed, 9 both in the Soviet Union and later nominally socialist regimes. This necessitated renewed reflection -as Adorno says in the above quoted passage, "Philosophy, which once seemed outmoded, remains alive because the moment of its realization was missed." 10 If the transformation of the world has failed, then this does not leave unaffected the theory that said we should transform, not merely interpret, the world. 11 Critical scrutiny of Marxist theory and its wider philosophical background is required, 12 with some of its elements having been shown to be deficient (about which more later). 13 Not least, what we need is an analysis of the Soviet Union and of how and why it embarked on the wrong patha path that included the use of forced labour and torture, 14 and the repressions of the more progressive socialist developments in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
15 9 See Negative Dialectics, p. 143; and 20.1:391; see also Critical Models, p. 290. 10 Negative Dialectics, p. 3; my emphasis. 11 See also Negative Dialectics, pp. 204f. 12 Negative Dialectics, pp. 3, 144. 13 It is impossible to characterise what Adorno means by philosophy (or "theory") in a way that is both accurate and succinct. However, it might help the reader to note that philosophy is not seen by Adorno as radically distinct from or discontinuous with sociology, history, and other theoretical endeavours (in this way he remains indebted to Horkheimer's interdisciplinary programme). His thesis that philosophy survives extends, thus, not only to what would be traditionally recognised as philosophy. Having said this, one important reason for why Adorno defends even philosophy traditionally understood -and not just theoretical endeavours further down the continuum of abstract reflection, such as historical, economic, or sociological analysis -is that ideas and theories shape the way we see and experience the world; and, in the absence of revolutionary transformation, combating distorted consciousness falls to theory (see also theses 4-5 below). 14 27 In a postscript to a 1955 study of workers at a factory in Germany, Adorno writes that the fact that the workers operate completely within the capitalist system -even when they complain and criticise capitalism -is to a large extent explained by their rejection of the Soviet Union and disillusionment about socialist alternatives.
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With the integration of the proletariat, the key element is missing from the Marxist view of a radical transformation: a social group that is (a) capable of gaining consciousness of the social world; (b) also capable of transforming this world as well as (c) required by its increasingly miserable condition to transform it (and in such a way, so as to free the whole of humanity, not just to replace one set of particular interests with another). These various elements now come apart. Those who can gain insight into the deeply problematic nature of late modern society might no longer be able to transform it and often rely on material and other privilege to gain the critical vantage point (they inhabit the "Grand Hotel Abyss", in 9
Lukács' memorable phrase). 29 Those who could transform the social world are no longer best placed to understand it and are often too materially integrated to enter into radical opposition to this world, but instead pursue narrow interests within it (say when the German, highly skilled working class pursues their narrowly conceived interests against less skilled working classes in Germany and other countries). Finally, those who are most miserable might neither have the capacity to understand nor, crucially, to transform the social world. Accodring to Adorno, no other social subject that reunites the three aspects has replaced the proletariat or could do so in the foreseeable future.
A second decisive factor for why revolutionary practice is blocked is that such practice would presuppose free and possibly autonomous individuals, but -according to to be organised in such a way as to involve blind command structures and severe punishment of suspected collaborators or traitors without the usual safeguards of due process. All things considered, these steps might have been necessary and unavoidable, but Adorno's point is that we would be mistaken to think that this means that nothing has gone wrong here -he denies that what is practically necessary always coincides with right living. Even in less extreme settings, there might be a tendency to suppress reflections and doubts among the ranks of a party or protest movements or to accept "collateral damage" in order to achieve maximum effect without delay. Indeed, even where resistance does not involve repression by those engaged in it, there is the further danger of its provoking repression, 38 and this might in turn lead to the resistance's becoming more violent and repressive, resulting in an escalation of violence and a net increase of repression. An illustration of this is the German student movement of the 1960s, the state's reaction to it, the left-wing terrorist cells that emerged in the 1970s in response to that, and, in turn, the state's reaction to them. For example, the terrorist group "Movement 2 June [Bewegung 2. Juni]" was named after the day at which a peaceful demonstrator -Benno Ohnesorg -was shot dead by a German policemen in Berlin.
It responded, in part, to the fact that the policemen in question was cleared of having committed any offence by the courts, which sparked mass protest and led to disillusionment with the German state. to withdrawing from society and not intervening in it at all -for, even when this is done out of protest or disgust, it just leaves in place or even inadvertedly strengthens a status quo which deserves to be changed. 45 In fact, he even criticises withdrawing into pure contemplation, rejecting it as resignation, 46 despite his otherwise positive comments on contemplation.
47 Surprisingly perhaps, he even admits that a focus on the aesthetic realmsomething of which he himself it is often said to have been guilty -is an expression of false consciousness. 48 Perhaps more surprisingly still, Adorno also concedes that even theory is affected by the illness of our social world. 49 In particular, the failure of the revolutionary practice and especially the integration of the proletariat mean that theory no longer has a social referent of the sort that Marx and Marxism envisages: a subject that is both capable to change the social world and forced by its own dire situation to do so. There are three main, interrelated reasons for this: firstly, the failure of revolutionary practice requires us to reflect critically on the revolutionary theory (as mentioned earlier, if the transformation of the world failed, its interpretation also requires rethinking); secondly, thought has -at least in the current context -more resources to avoid negative, unintended repercussions than praxis (revolutionary or otherwise); and, finally, one of the main obstacles to revolutionary practice and one of the main factors towards renewed barbarism is the integration, even poisoning of consciousness, against which theorising can offer some immunisation strategies. Let me expand on each of these three reasons in turn.
In a dialectical inversion not untypical of Adorno's thinking, he writes:
The desperate state of affairs, that the praxis on which everything depends is thwarted, paradoxically affords thinking the breathing-space which it would practically be criminal not to use.
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One of the key reasons why Adorno thinks that praxis demands that theory takes precedence now is that the failed transformation of the world revealed problems in revolutionary theorysome of which I mentioned already above. Specifically, one of the important elements that have been missing for revolutionary praxis to become possible again is a renewed analysis of the situation and its constraints. 55 Prior to having this analysis, revolutionary praxis or attempts to resurrect it are doomed. One important aspect here is the issue of finding forms of organisation and, more generally, praxis that are not repressive. Crucial for this is to analyse those well-intentioned forms of praxis that backfired, sometimes terribly -such as the nominally socialist regimes.
Adorno sometimes overstates his case in ways that conflicts with some of his other key insights:
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The Archimedian point -how a nonrepressive praxis might be possible, how one might steer between the alternatives of spontaneity and organization -this point, if it exists at all, cannot be found other than through theory. Columbia University Press, 1958), had already provided the critical analysis of nominal socialism or that he was not best equipped to undertake this task. Also, perhaps he focused on, so to speak, the devil he knewespecially given how little reliable sociological data from the Soviet block there was and that he would have been unable to undertake or commission independent studies there. Still, it strikes me as a lacuna in his work. There is another aspect here: while the individual theorist lacks power because he or she is at the margins of society (and no longer the avant-garde of a major social class), this very marginal existence also means that theorists are exempted or excluded from practices of the kind which integrates the majority of people into the social world -be it via the disciplinary effects of the workplace or other integrative social pressures inherent in many practices. 66 There is dialectic irony here: by lacking real force and being good for nothing in the current world, philosophy has critical potential.
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A third reason for theory's priority is that an analysis of and an enlightenment about distortions in our consciousness is necessary both, in the first instance, as a defensive act against irrational and fascist tendencies objectively present in our social world, and, secondly, for revolutionary practice. In a nutshell, Adorno thinks that one of the main reasons why Auschwitz happened and why a capitalist society in the West and a repressive bureaucratic regime in the East can sustain themselves, despite both disregarding the real interests of the individuals living in them, is a distortion of consciousness and an increasing reduction of genuine experiences that could reveal this distortion. Of utmost practical importance is thus to change our consciousness and enhance our ability to have as unrestricted experiences as Adorno thinks that theory should maintain a certain independence especially vis-à-vis direct political action and tactic. 85 The reasons for this are manifold.
Firstly, Adorno argues that division of labour produces here, as in many other areas of life, better results than merging two activities and having them carried out together by the same actors. At one point, he offers an interesting analogy: the rigorous pursuit of physics has yielded many useful results for practical activities in other human spheres, and, specifically, nuclear physics might have enabled the development of a new form of energy-generation, but this happened as a by-product of autonomous theorising, not as a consequence of aiming for a new energy source or of having been commissioned to find one.
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Secondly, Adorno also criticises the demand that theory should be practically applicable, utilisable, or exploitable by pointing out that what is practically applicable, utilisable, or exploitable is determined by the wrong social world that we should change. 87 It is the nature of this world that it allows only reforms and activities which stay within it, so that whenever we limit theory by what is practically possible, we make radical social critique impossible. Thus, rather than enabling revolutionary practice, such a demand would be to abandon it. Moreover, this demand is also infected by the constant pressure to contribute to social production characteristic of both capitalist and nominally socialist regimes 88 -by the productivist ethos to utilise every minute to the full and to keep all wheels constantly turning.
Rather than accepting and partaking in these pressures, we should criticise them and refuse to join in, where we can.
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Thirdly, and picking up a theme from earlier (see thesis 4), it would be too much to ask of theory to require that it provides a blueprint for a better world: 90 at least when it comes to ethical and political activities, theory is a reflective, not so much a predictive medium.
Theory cannot solve problems in this area of life, but has to rely first on the development of practical solutions which it can then help refining. Theorising, even imagining, is bound by the materials of the status quo and, if at all, it can yield only something radically different from it at a too abstract level to be directly applicable in practice.
All of this is not to say that critical theory has no practical telos -according to Adorno, every thought has such a telos. 91 However, this practical orientation is merely indirectly prescribed in theoretical activity -otherwise, it sabotages thinking and thereby itself. To return to an earlier analogy: nuclear physics has a connection to possible praxis, not because it stands under the imperative of yielding practical implementations, but because it involves an exercise of reason, which by its nature has a connection to the practical teloi of humanity; similarly, critical theory should not be subjected to the demands of practical applicability (as measured and shaped by the current social world), but retains nonetheless a 88 See Critical Models, pp. 289f. 89 See, for example, Problems of Moral Philosophy, pp. 167f. 90 See, for example, 8:454. 91 Critical Models, pp. 264f. 
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In sum, Adorno saw Western Germany as a fragile democracy which needed nurturing, not least because the existing and past alternatives to it were so much worse, including the nominally socialist regimes to the East -which brings us to the next thesis.
8
Political activity in the West should be critical but broadly defensive.
While the liberal-capitalist West deserves radical change -a change that is, however, blocked for the foreseeable future (see thesis 2) -its socio-political system provided the least bad alternative available in the 1960s. In this context, its positive gains -such as freedom of expression, rule of law, material wealth, and public health systems -should be defended.
Such defence might even include trying to extend the range of areas of life that benefit from these gains (for example, campaigning to secure for same sex couples the legal rights that so far only heterosexual couples enjoyed This disagreement is intimately linked with to the next thesis.
9
Political violence should be restricted to resistance in fascist contexts.
While Adorno did not exclude the use of (political) violence categorically for all circumstances, he was adamant that it had no place within democratic societies. Firstly, Adorno suspects that actionism is actually a vain attempt to compensate for both (a) the fact that revolutionary activity is blocked and (b) the disintegration and paranoia of individuals by engaging in largely blind activities for their own sake. 119 Presumably, what he means here is not that this is the result of a conscious decision, but rather that the selfstyled acts of resistance and provocation are, in fact, mere compensatory measures of keeping busy -indeed, he once likens them to captured animals that frantically pace up and down in their cages. 120 In this way, the activities are more like pseudo-activities, such that the tragedy of the failed transformation of the world in the early 20 th century is now repeated as the farce of pseudo-revolutions. 124 Rather, his point seems to be that the satisfaction in question is merely an Ersatzbefriedigung, a vicarious satisfaction. 125 Also, what he criticises is that the pursuit of instant gratification is replacing the one of critical reflection -making it more likely that the protest movements are co-opted into the mainstream. Instead of a real analysis of the concrete situation and its possibilities, actionism is blindly pursuing narcissistic gains at the expense of the pain-staking and demanding reflective work that is necessary. This is partly revealed in the activists' refusal of critical introspection. 126 Moreover, Adorno highlights the danger that actionism develops a dynamic of its own, whereby actions are undertaken merely to maintain the momentum of the movement (often by way of publicity stunts), independently of the wisdom or necessity of undertaking the acts in question. 127 Thirdly, Adorno objects to what he perceives as a refusal and also inability to make genuine and unrestricted experiences. 128 As seen already (thesis 4), Adorno emphasises that it is exactly in this area where those that were lucky enough not yet to be co-opted should actby criticising the conceptualisations that distort and narrow our experiences, and by educating people to develop their experiential capacities. Adorno thinks these crucial efforts are undermined by people's jumping headfirst into political activities and cutting short debate with reference to practical urgency. Generally, he criticises the lack of analysis and the fact that, in the absence of theory, praxis becomes delusional.
